hen we were treating of the
passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be
observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason
of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's
object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since
it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in
itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks
(Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil."
Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge,
since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is
found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in
respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in
anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason
demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's
anger is deserving of praise.

Reply Obj. 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions
as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they
deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 24, A. 2) when we were treating of the passions. It is in
this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger
whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing
him a wrong.--But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion
Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions
of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be
moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not
always evil.

Reply Obj. 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First,
antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and
has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch
as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice
and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called
"zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "We must
beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it
overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of
following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey."
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason
in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of
reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that "zealous anger
troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful ang