s; and even
the doings of the fleet become in a measure matters of routine.
All the ordinary business of life tends to routine, in order that
men may so arrange their time, that they may have regular hours
for work, recreation, and sleep, and be able to make engagements
for the future.

But when war breaks out, all routine is instantly abolished. The
element of surprise, which each side strives to interject into
its operations, is inherently a foe to routine. In a routine life,
expected things occur--it is the office of routine to arrange that
expected things shall occur, and at expected times; in a routine
life one is always prepared to see a certain thing happen at a
certain time. Surprise breaks in on all this, and makes unexpected
things occur, and therefore finds men unprepared. It is the office
of surprise to catch men unprepared.

Appreciating this, and appreciating the value of starting a war
by achieving some great success, and of preventing the enemy from
so doing, military countries in recent years have advanced more and
more their preparations for war, even in time of the profoundest
peace, in order that, when war breaks out, they may be prepared
either to take the offensive at once, or to repel an offensive at
once. With whatever forces a nation expects or desires to fight
in a war, no matter whether it will begin on the offensive or begin
on the defensive, the value to the nation of those forces will
depend on how soon they are gotten ready. In a navy, the active
fleet may be considered always ready; but the personnel and the
craft of various kinds that must be added to it cannot be added
to it as quickly as is desirable--because it is desirable that
they should be added immediately, which is impossible.

It is not in the nature of things that they should get ready as
quickly as a fleet that has been kept ready always; but it is essential
that the handicap to the operations of the active fleet, due to the
tardiness of its additions, should be kept as small as possible.
In other words, whatever additions are to be made to the active
fleet should be made as quickly as possible.

When the additions are made to the fleet (reserve ships and men,
ships and men from civil life, etc.) it is clear that those ships
and men should at that time be ready for effective work. If the
ships are not in condition for effective work by reason of being
out of order, or by reason of the ships from civil life not having
b