lness
for them. One field will be in assisting the land defenses, in
protecting the mouths of harbors and mine-fields, in defending
submarine bases, and acting as station ships in the coast-defense
system.

_Second Object_.--To repel an enemy expedition, striving to establish
a base in the Caribbean, preparation would have to be made for
as prompt a mobilization as possible; for although the threat of
invasion of our coast would not carry with it the idea of such
early execution as would a direct attack on New York, yet the actual
establishment of a base so near our shores would give such advantages
to a hostile nation for a future invasion, that measures to prevent
it should be undertaken with the utmost possible thoroughness and
despatch; because the operation of establishing a base involves
many elements of difficulty that an active defender can hinder
by aeroplane attacks, etc.; whereas, after a base has once been
established and equipped with appropriate defenses, attacks upon
it are much less productive of results.

The endeavor to establish a base and the opposing effort to prevent
it, will offer many opportunities for excellent work on both sides.
Practically all the elements of naval force will be engaged, and
events on the largest possible scale may be expected. The operations
will naturally be more extended both in time and distance than
in the case of a direct attack upon our coast, and therefore the
task of logistics will be greater. Actual battle between large
forces; minor engagements among aircraft, scouts, submarines, and
destroyers; attacks on the train of the invader--even conflicts
on shore--will be among the probabilities.

_Third Object_.--To send a large expedition to carry out naval
operations in far distant waters--in the south Atlantic, for instance,
to prevent the extension of a monarchical government in South America,
or in the western Pacific to defend our possessions there--calls
for plans involving more logistical calculation and execution,
but permitting a more leisurely procedure. The distances to be
traversed are so great, the lack of bases is so distinct and so
difficult to remedy, and the impossibility of arriving in time
to prevent the seizing of land by any hostile expedition is so
evident, that they combine to necessitate great thoroughness of
preparation and only such a measure of despatch as can be secured
without endangering thoroughness. Whether the projected expedition
s