of 16 to 9; and that if it is superior in the ratio of 1,100 to
1,000 the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the
ratio of 2 to 1, in the proportion of 16 to 6. We also see that we
should, after reducing the enemy to 0, have forces represented by
422, 1,073, and 1,683, respectively, and suffer losses represented
by 678, 427, and 317, respectively.

Now the difference in fighting forces cannot be measured in units
of material and personnel only, though they furnish the most accurate
general guide. Two other factors of great importance enter, the
factors of skill and morale. Skill is perhaps more of an active
agent, and morale is perhaps more of a passive agent, like the
endurance of man or the strength of material; and yet in some battles
morale has been a more important factor in attaining victory than
even skill. It is not vital to this discussion which is the more
important; but it is vital to realize clearly that skill and morale
are not to be forgotten, when we calculate how many and what kinds
of material and personnel units we must provide for a war; and
inasmuch as we cannot weigh morale and skill, or even be sure in
most cases as to which side will possess them in the superior degree,
we are forced in prudence to assume that the enemy may possess
them in a superior degree, and that therefore we should secure
superadequacy in units of personnel and material; not so much to
win victory with the minimum of loss to ourselves, as simply to
avert disaster.

The present war shows us that the factors of skill and morale,
while independent of each other, are closely linked together, and
react upon each other. Nothing establishes a good morale more than
does the knowledge of exceeding skill; and nothing promotes skill
more than does an enthusiastic and firm morale.

But superadequateness of preparation has a value greater than in
merely insuring victory with minimum loss to ourselves, in case
war comes, because it exerts the most potent of all influences in
preventing war, since it warns an enemy against attacking. At the
present day, the laws of victory and defeat are so well understood,
and the miseries resulting from defeat are so thoroughly realized,
that no civilized country will voluntarily go to war, except for
extraneous reasons, if it realizes that the chances of success
are small. And as the cumulative consequences of defeats are also
realized, and as no country is apt to assume that the morale