various mechanisms of naval warfare were few,
and those few simple. In our Navy Department the work of supplying
those mechanisms was divided among several bureaus, and each bureau
was given the duty and the accompanying power of supplying its
particular quota. The rapid multiplication, during the past fifty
years, of new mechanisms, and new kinds of mechanisms; the increased
expense of those mechanisms compared with that of former mechanisms;
the increased size and power of vessels, guns, and engines; the
increased size and complexity of the utilities in navy-yards for
handling them; the necessity for providing and using means and
methods for despatching the resulting "business" speedily, and
for guarding against mistakes in handling the multiplicity of
details--the increase, in brief, in the number, size, and kinds
of things that have to be done in preparation, has brought about
not only more labor in doing those things by the various bureaus
assigned to do them, but has brought about even more imperiously
the demand for means whereby the central authority shall be assured
that each bureau is doing its work. And it has brought about more
imperiously still a demand that a clear conception shall be formed
first of what must be done, and second of the maximum time that
can be allowed for doing it.

Clearly, the forming of a correct conception should not be expected
of men not trained to form it; clearly, for instance, mere knowledge
of electricity and mere skill in using electrical instruments cannot
enable a man to devise radio apparatus for naval use; a certain
amount of knowledge of purely naval and nautical matters is needed
in addition. Clearly, the concept as to the kind of performance
to be required of radio apparatus is not to be expected of a mere
technician, but is to be expected of a strategist--and equally
the ability to design, construct, and supply the apparatus is not
to be expected of a strategist, but it is to be expected of a
technician.

A like remark may be made concerning any mechanism--say a gun, a
torpedo, or an instrument, or a vessel of any kind. The strategist,
by studying the requirements of probable war, concludes that a
certain kind of thing is needed; and the technician supplies it,
or does so to the best of his ability.

The statement thus far made indicates a division of work into two
sharply defined departments; and, theoretically, such a division
does exist. This does not mean, howe