er of copying and of filling in blank forms.

As all navy departments have means regulated by law such that the
actual executive work of recruiting, constructing, and supplying the
necessary personnel and material shall be done by certain bureaus
and offices, strategy does not need executive power, except for
forcing the bureaus and offices to do the necessary work--should
such forcing become necessary. Strategy being the art of being
a general (_strategos_), one cannot conceive of it as bereft of
executive power, since we cannot conceive of a general exercising
generalship without having executive power. It is true that strategy
occupies itself mainly with planning--but so does a general; and
it is also true that strategy itself does not make the soldiers
march, but neither does a general; it is the colonels and captains
and corporals who make the soldiers march. The general plans the
campaign and arranges the marches, the halts, the bivouacs, provisions,
ammunition, etc., through his logistical officers, and they give
the executive officers general instructions as to how to carry
out the general's plans.

Strategy without executive functions would be like a mind that could
think, but was imprisoned in a body which was paralyzed.

Of course, strategy should have executive functions for the purposes
of strategy only; under the guidance of policy and to execute policy's
behests. Policy is the employer, and strategy the employee.

CHAPTER XI

NAVAL BASES

The nature of naval operations necessitates the expenditure of
fuel, ammunition, and supplies; wear and tear of machinery; fatigue
of personnel; and a gradual fouling of the bottoms of the ships.
In case actual battles mark the operations, the expenditure of
stored-up energy of all kinds is very great indeed, and includes not
only damage done to personnel and material by the various agencies
of destruction, but actual loss of vessels.

To furnish the means of supplying and replenishing the stored-up
energy required for naval operations is the office of naval bases.

A naval base capable of doing this for a large fleet must be a
very great establishment. In such a naval base, one must be able
to build, dock, and repair vessels of all kinds, and the mechanisms
needed in those vessels; anchor a large fleet in safety behind adequate
military and naval protection; supply enough fuel, ammunition,
and supplies for all purposes, and accommodate large reserves of