hat every man has recently served in the regular navy, has been
kept in training ever since he left it, and that he is competent to
perform the duties of his allotted station in battleship _A_.

The problem of getting into service the ships that are to be gotten
from the merchant service is more difficult, and is perhaps of more
importance; that is, it is more important to get into the service
some vessels from the merchant service than some reserve ships; more
important, for instance, to get colliers to serve the fleet with
coal than to commission some antiquated cruisers. Naturally, the
number and kinds of ships that need to be provided will depend on
the nature of the war--whether, for instance, a very large force
is to be sent to the other side of the world, to meet a powerful
fleet there, or whether a sudden attack on our Atlantic coast is
to be repelled. The difference, however, is largely numerical; so
that if the plans provide for a sufficient number to take part
in the distant expedition, it will be easy to get the appropriate
number to meet a coast attack.

To receive an attack upon the coast, however, provision must be
made for vessels and men not needed on an expedition across the
seas--that is, for vessels and men that will defend the coast itself
from raids and similar expeditions.

The work of preparing all that part of the naval machine which
in time of peace is separate from the active fleet is purely one
of logistics; it is that part of the preparation which calculates
what ways and means are needed, and then supplies those ways and
means. Logistics, having been told by strategy what strategy plans
to do, calculates how many and what kinds of vessels, men, guns,
torpedoes, fuel, food, hospital service, ammunition, etc., are
needed to make possible the fulfilling of those plans; and then
proceeds to provide what it has calculated must be provided.

This does not mean that strategy should hold itself aloof from
logistics and make arbitrary demands upon it; for such a procedure
would result in making demands that logistics could not supply; or,
through an underestimate of what logistics can supply, in refraining
from demanding as much as could be supplied. Logistics, of course,
does provide what strategy wants, in so far as it can; but in order
that satisfactory results may be obtained, the fullest co-operation
between strategy and logistics is essential; and to this end frequent
conferences are requ