and
the nearest to countries in Europe and Asia with any one of which,
of course, war will be always possible, and sometimes probable.
Each is a small and rugged island, admitting of tremendous military
strengthening by guns, fortifications, mines, and submarines, but
connected to the motherland by a long line of communications. The
line of communications of Culebra would, of course, be safer than
that of Guam, because it is shorter than would be the line of an
enemy attacking it; whereas, the line of communications of Guam
would be longer. Guantanamo and Pearl Harbor are both stations about
half-way from the home country to Culebra and Guam respectively; and
though greater danger to our vital and commercial interests exists
in the Atlantic than in the Pacific, Pearl Harbor has been fortified,
and Guantanamo has not--and neither has Culebra. This sentence is
not intended as a criticism of the government for fortifying Pearl
Harbor. The Hawaiian Islands occupy the most valuable strategic
position in the Pacific, and Pearl Harbor is the most important
strategic place in the Hawaiian Islands; and it ought to have been
strengthened many years ago, and to a greater degree even than is
contemplated now. But the sentence is intended as a protest against
our continued inertness in failing to establish any suitable naval
bases whatever, especially in the Caribbean.

_Distant Base in the Philippines_.--The difficulty of finding suitable
positions for bases is exemplified in the Philippines, for no suitable
island is to be found there, except some that are within the archipelago
itself; and these are so placed that, to reach them, our fleet
would have to go through long reaches of water, ideally suited for
destroyer and submarine attack. A possible exception is the island
of Polillo, twenty miles east of the eastern coast of Luzon; and in
many ways Polillo seems ideal. The practical difficulties are so
great, however, the status of the islands in our national policy is
so ill defined, and the futility of strengthening it, unless Guam
be adequately strengthened also, is so apparent, that the question
has been hardly even mooted. Polillo made impregnable, with Guam
defenseless, supported by an undefended line of communications
several thousand miles long to the main country, would in case
of war with an active Asiatic power be reduced to the zero of
effectiveness in whatever was the length of time in which its
accumulated stores w