t by radio, but it is not at all certain. A great proportion
of the steamers met would willingly obey an order not to report
it, or even to have their radio apparatus deranged; either because
of national sympathy, or because the captain was "insulted with
a very considerable bribe." The probability, therefore, would be
that we should hear of the departure of the fleet from Europe, and
then hear nothing more about it until it was met by our scouts.

This reasoning shows that to carry out the plans of strategy, logistics
would have to provide plans and means to execute those plans, whereby
our existing fleet, plus all the additions which strategy demanded,
would be waiting at whatever points on the ocean strategy might
indicate, before the coming enemy would reach those points. In
other words, logistics must make and execute such plans that all
the fleet which strategy demands will be at the selected points
in less than two weeks from the time the enemy leaves the shores
of Europe.

Of course, the conditions will not necessarily be such that strategy
will demand that all our reserve ships, especially the oldest ships,
shall go out to sea with the active fleet, ready to engage in battle.
Maybe some of them will be found to be so slow and equipped with
such short-range guns, that they would be an embarrassment to the
commander-in-chief, instead of an assistance. Unless it is clear,
however, that any ship, especially a battleship, _would be an
embarrassment_, her place is clearly with the fighting fleet. The
issue of the battle cannot be known in advance; and as everything
will depend upon that issue, no effort and no instrument should be
spared that can assist in gaining victory. And even if the older
ships might not be of material assistance in the early stages of
a battle, they would do no harm because they could be kept out
of the way, if need be. In case either side gains a conclusive
victory at once, the older ships will do neither good nor harm;
but in case a decisive result is not at once attained, and both
sides are severely damaged, the old ships, held in reserve, may
then come in fresh and whole, like the reserve in land engagements,
and add a fighting force which at that time will be most important
and may be decisive.

Probably some of the ships will be too old, however, to fill places
of any value in the active fleet. These should be fully manned and
equipped, however, for there will be many fields of usefu