their sophistry; and as
a storm seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and
Ctesippus then says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only
contradicting them. 'But,' says Dionysodorus, 'there is no such thing as
contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe
one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?'
Ctesippus is unable to reply.

Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would
like to be informed by the great master of the art, 'What is the meaning
of this paradox? Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood?
Then what are they professing to teach?' The two Sophists complain
that Socrates is ready to answer what they said a year ago, but
is 'non-plussed' at what they are saying now. 'What does the word
"non-plussed" mean?' Socrates is informed, in reply, that words are
lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus
again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews
the conversation with Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the
variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus in the Odyssey,
hopes to restore them to their natural form.

He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a
philosopher. And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and
knowledge must be of a kind which is profitable and may be used. What
knowledge is there which has such a nature? Not the knowledge which is
required in any particular art; nor again the art of the composer of
speeches, who knows how to write them, but cannot speak them, although
he too must be admitted to be a kind of enchanter of wild animals.
Neither is the knowledge which we are seeking the knowledge of the
general. For the general makes over his prey to the statesman, as the
huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails to the keeper of
quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The two enquirers,
Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in a wilderness,
vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At last they fix
upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of knowledge. But the
kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither good nor evil:
and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does it make us
wise? Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering, but only
in itself: or say again that it makes us good, there is no answe