evil, and gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can
it be, and what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is
the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?
CRITO: By all means.
SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat
that they will make others good, and that these others will make others
again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have
put aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old,
old song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther,
from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.
CRITO: Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great
perplexity.
SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck,
I lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the
strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument;
they were our Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and
show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us
to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.
CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?
SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following
effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this
knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you
already have it?
What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?
Indeed I am.
Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a
knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to
learn.
Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?
Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance.
That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is,
and at the same time is not what it is?
Certainly not.
And did you not say that you knew something?
I did.
If you know, you are knowing.
Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.
That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know
all things?
Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not
know.
And if you do not know, you are not knowing.
Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.
Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing;
and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to
the same things.
A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthy
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