nd censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the
courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which
they do battle?

CRITO: He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever
been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a
clever man, and composes wonderful speeches.

SOCRATES: Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class,
whom I was on the point of mentioning--one of those whom Prodicus
describes as on the border-ground between philosophers and
statesmen--they think that they are the wisest of all men, and that
they are generally esteemed the wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the
philosophers stands in their way; and they are of the opinion that if
they can prove the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will
dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves
really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and
his friends, when they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion
which they entertain of their own wisdom is very natural; for they
have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain amount of political
wisdom; there is reason in what they say, for they argue that they have
just enough of both, and so they keep out of the way of all risks and
conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom.

CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something
specious in that notion of theirs.

SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they cannot
be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or
things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate
in both of them--if one of these two things is good and the other evil,
are better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in
a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they
fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of
their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do
not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either.
Now, if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to
different ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between
them, then they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either;
or, if the one be good and the other evil, they are better than the one
and worse than the other; only on the supposition that they are both
evil c