iderable goods.

I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.

Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the
greatest of them all.

What is that? he asked.

Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to
be the greatest of goods.

True, he said.

On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you
and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.

Why do you say so?

Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but
repeating ourselves.

What do you mean?

I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward
good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same
thing twice over.

He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is
good-fortune; even a child may know that.

The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said
to him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate
and successful in performing on the flute?

He assented.

And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?

Certainly.

Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole
than wise pilots?

None, certainly.

And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take
the risk--in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?

With a wise one.

And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a
dangerous illness--a wise physician, or an ignorant one?

A wise one.

You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to
act with an ignorant one?

He assented.

Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever
err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would
be wisdom no longer.

We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general
conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then
recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I
said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if
many good things were present with us?

He assented.

And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they
profited us not, or if they profited us?

If they profited us, he said.

And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For
example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great