ould be for light to shine in an Edison
lamp which had been deprived of its carbon-burner.

The great advantage of this theory is, that it supposes only one stream
of causation, in which both mind and motion are simultaneously
concerned. The theory, therefore, escapes all the difficulties and
contradictions with which both spiritualism and materialism are beset.
Thus, motion is supposed to be producing nothing but motion;
mind-changes nothing but mind-changes--both producing both
simultaneously: neither could be what it is without the other, because
without the other neither could be the cause which in fact it is.
Impossible, therefore, is the supposition of the materialist that
consciousness is adventitious, or that in the absence of mind the
changes of the brain could be what they are; for it belongs to the very
causation of these movements that they should have a mental side. And
equally impossible is the supposition of the spiritualist that the
cerebral processes are adventitious, or that in the absence of brain the
changes of the mind could be what they are; for it belongs to the very
causation of these changes that they should have a material side.
Furthermore, the use of mind to animals and to men is thus rendered
apparent; for intelligent volition is thus shown to be a true cause of
adjustive movement, in that the cerebration which it involves could not
otherwise be possible: the causation would not otherwise be complete.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 8: _Lectures and Essays_, vol. ii. pp. 56-7.]

CHAPTER IV.

THE WORLD AS AN EJECT.

In the Introduction to this essay I have sought to show that there are,
for the purposes of practical discussion, but three theories of the
World of Being. There is, first, the theory of Materialism, which
supposes matter in motion to be the ultimate or self-existing Reality,
and, therefore, the cause of mind. Next, there is the theory of
Spiritualism, which supposes mind to be the ultimate Reality, and,
therefore, the cause of matter in motion. Lastly, there is the theory of
Monism which supposes matter in motion to be substantially identical
with mind, and, therefore, that as between mind and matter in motion
there is no causal relation either way. In the foregoing chapters I have
considered these three theories, and argued that of them the
last-mentioned is the only one which satisfies all the facts of feeling
on the one hand, and of observation on the other. The theory o