dient so to fall in with
the general stream of external causation. Hence, as a general rule, it
is only in cases where the stream of external causation is drawing the
will in different directions that the causal activity of the Will itself
is called into play. Or rather, I should say, it is only in such cases
that we become conscious of the fact. In the case of every voluntary
movement the primal activity of Will must be concerned (and this even in
the case of the lower animals); but as the vast majority of such
movements are performed by way of response to frequently recurring
circumstances, the response which experience has shown to be most
expedient is given, as it were, automatically, or without the occurrence
of any adverse motive. But in cases where motives are drawing in
different directions, we become conscious of an effort of Will in
choosing one or other line of conduct, and, according to our present
hypothesis, this consciousness of effort is an expression of the work
which the Will is doing in the way of spontaneous causation.

Thus, upon the whole, if we identify the principle of causation with the
principle of mind--as we are bound to do by the theory of Monism--we
thereby draw a great and fundamental distinction between causation as
this occurs in the external world, and as it occurs within the limits of
our own subjectivity. And the distinction consists in the unconditional
nature of a causal sequence in the external world, as against the
conditional nature of it in the other case; the condition to the
effective operation of a motive--as distinguished from a motor--is the
acquiescence of the first cause upon which that motive is operating.

To the foregoing argument it may be objected that by expressly regarding
the human mind as a first cause of its own volitions, I imply that that
mind can itself have had no cause, which appears to be self-evidently
absurd. But here again the absurdity only arises from our inveterate
habit of regarding the principle of causation as logically prior to that
of mind. If we expressly refuse to do this, there is nothing absurd in
supposing the principle of mind wherever it occurs, as itself uncaused.
For if, as we are now supposing, this principle is identical with that
of causation, to say that any mind is caused would be to say that a
cause is the cause of itself, which would be really absurd. Under the
present point of view, therefore, it would be a meaningless question