. And, as I have
now repeatedly insisted, on grounds of physiology alone this is the only
logical conclusion at which it is possible to arrive. Yet Mr. Spencer,
while elsewhere proceeding on the lines of physiology, whenever he
encounters the question of the agency of Will, habitually jumps the
whole gulf that separates Materialism from Spiritualism. And this
wonderful feat of intellectual athletics is likewise performed, so far
at least as I am aware, by every other psychologist who has proceeded on
the lines of physiology. Indeed, the logical incoherency is not so
serious in Mr. Spencer's case as it is in that of many other writers
whom I need not wait to name. For Mr. Spencer does not seek to found his
system on a basis of avowed Materialism, and, therefore, he may be said
to have left this fundamental question of volitional agency in abeyance.
But all those writers who have reared their systems of psychology on a
basis of avowed Materialism--or, which is the same thing, on a basis of
physiology alone--lay themselves open to the charge of grossest
inconsistency when they thus assume that the Will is an agent. It is
impossible that these writers can both have their cake and eat it.
Either they must forego their Materialism, or else they must cease to
speak of 'motives determining action,' 'conduct being governed by
pleasures and pains,' 'voluntary movements in their last resort being
all due to bodily feelings,' 'the highest morality and the lowest vice
being alike the result of a pursuit of happiness,' &c. &c. And, so far
as I can see, it is only in the way above indicated, or on the theory of
Monism, that it is possible, without ignoring the facts of physiology on
the one hand or those of psychology on the other, philosophically to
save the agency of Will.

From this brief exposition it may be gathered that on the materialistic
theory it is impossible that the Will can be, in any sense of the term,
an agent; that on the spiritualistic theory the Will is regarded as an
agent, but only in the sense of a non-natural or miraculous cause; and,
lastly, that on the monistic theory the Will is saved as an agent, or
may be properly regarded and as properly denominated a true cause, in
the ordinary sense of that term. For this, as well as for other reasons
which need not here be specified, I accept in philosophy the theory of
Monism; and am thus entitled in psychology to proceed upon the doctrine
that the Will is an agent. We