iption of matter in
motion--so that it shall in itself constitute a little working
microcosm--appears to be the first condition to the being of a
subjective personality. Why, then, does not the working of a machine
present a subjective side?

Our answer to this question is to be found in the following
considerations. We are going upon the hypothesis that all mind is matter
in motion, and that all matter in motion is mind--or, as Clifford
phrased it, that all the external world is composed of mind-stuff. No
matter how lightly we may shade _x_, we are assuming that it must be
shaded, and not left perfectly white. Now, both mind and matter in
motion admit of degrees: first as to quantity, next as to velocity, and
lastly as to complexity. But the degrees of matter in motion are found,
in point of observable fact, not to correspond with those of mind, save
in the last particular of complexity, where there is unquestionably an
evident correspondence. Therefore it is that a machine, although
conforming to the prime condition of subjectivity in being a
circumscribed system of matter in motion, nevertheless does not attain
to subjectivity: the _x_ does not rise to _z_ because the internal
processes of _x_ are not sufficiently intricate, or their intricacy is
not of the appropriate kind. From which it follows that although, as I
have said, all matter in motion is mind, merely as matter in motion (or
irrespective of the kinds and degrees of both) it may not necessarily be
mind in the elaborated form of consciousness: it may only be the raw
material of mind--or, as Clifford called it, mind-stuff. Thus, although
all conscious volition is matter in motion, it does not follow that all
matter in motion is conscious volition. Which serves to restate the
question as to how far it is probable, or improbable, that all matter in
motion is conscious volition--i.e. how deeply we ought to shade _x_.

Well, the first thing to be considered in answering this question is
that, according to the theory of Monism, we _know_ that it is within the
range of possibility for matter in motion to reach a level of intricacy
which shall yield conscious volition, and even self-conscious thought of
an extremely high order of development. Therefore, the only question is
as to whether it is possible, or in any way probable, that matter in
motion as occurring in _x_ resembles, in point of intricacy, matter in
motion as occurring in _z_. Professor Clifford percei