the reality may be psychical, and the
physical symbolic; everywhere matter in motion may be the outward and
visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace.

Take again the case of morality and religion. Because science, by its
theory of evolution, appears to be in a fair way of explaining the
genesis of these things by natural causes, theists are taking alarm; it
is felt by them that if morality can be fully explained by utility, and
religion by superstition, the reality of both is destroyed. But Monism
teaches that such a view is entirely erroneous. For, according to
Monism, the natural causation of morality and religion has nothing
whatever to do with the ultimate truth of either. The natural causation
is merely a record of physical processes, serving to manifest the
psychical processes. Nor can it make any difference, as regards the
ultimate veracity of the moral and religious feelings, that they have
been developed slowly by natural causes; that they were at first grossly
selfish on the one hand, and hideously superstitious on the other; that
they afterwards went through a long series of changes, none of which
therefore can have fully corresponded with external truth; or that even
now they may be both extremely far from any such correspondence. All
that such considerations go to prove is, that it belongs to the natural
method of mental evolution in man that with advancing culture his
ejective interpretations of Nature should more and more nearly
_approximate_ the truth. The world-eject must necessarily vary with the
character of the human subject; but this does not prove that the
ejective interpretation has throughout been wrong in _method_: it only
proves that such interpretation has been imperfect--and necessarily
imperfect--in _application_.

Such, then, I conceive to be one of the most important consequences of
the monistic theory. Namely, that by regarding physical causation as
everywhere but the objective or phenomenal aspect of an ejective or
ontological reality, it furnishes a logical basis for a theory of things
which is at the same time natural and spiritual. On the objective
aspect, the explanations furnished by reason are of necessity physical,
while, on the ejective aspect, such explanations are of necessity
metaphysical--or rather, let us say, hyper-physical. But these two
orders of explanation are different only because their modes of
interpreting the same events are different. The objective explanati