ith that
of Volition. For if Cause is but another name for Will--whether the Will
be subjective or ejective--it follows that my will is a first cause,
which is determined by other causes only in so far as the executive
capacity of my body is so determined. As the whole stress of any
objection to the present argument must thus be brought to bear upon the
validity of this its fundamental premiss, a few words may now be said to
show that the premiss is not wholly gratuitous. Of course the reason why
at first sight it is apt to appear, not only gratuitous, but even
grotesque, is because in these days of physical science the minds of
most of us are dominated by the unthinking persuasion that the principle
of causality is the most ultimate principle which our minds can reach.
Most of us accept this persuasion as almost of the nature of an axiom,
and hence the mere suggestion that our own volitions are really uncaused
appears to us of the nature of a self-evident absurdity. A little
thought, however, is enough to show that the only ground of reason which
this strong prepossession can rest upon, is the assumption that the
principle of causality is logically prior to that of mind. Therefore it
is the validity of this assumption that we have here to investigate.

In the first place, then, the assumption is _ipso facto_ irrational. For
it is evident that in order to make the assumption there must already be
a mind to make it. In other words, the very conception of the principle
of causality implies a thinking substance wherein that conception
arises, and therefore, as a mere matter of formal statement, it is
impossible to assign logical priority to this conception over the thing
whereby it is conceived.

In the next place, when we carefully analyze the nature of this
conception itself, we find that it arises immediately out of our
conception of Being as Being. This is shown by the idea of _equivalency_
between cause and effect, which is an essential feature of the
conception of causality as such. In other words, the statement of any
causal relation is merely a statement of the fact that both the matter
and the energy concerned in the event were of a permanent nature and
unalterable amount. Therefore, _if_ the ultimate Reality is mental,
Causation _must_ be ontologically identical with Volition. And that the
ultimate Reality is either mental, or something greater, seems to be
proved by the consideration that if it be supposed anyt