t fact is
habitually overlooked by materialists themselves, or that whenever a
materialist espouses the cause of determinism, he is thereby and for the
time being vacating his position as a materialist; for if, according to
his theory, the Will is not an agent, he is merely impugning his own
doctrines by consenting to discuss the conditions of its agency.

The theory of Spiritualism and the theory of Monism agree in holding
that the Will is an agent; and, therefore, to both of these theories the
question whether the Will is a free agent is a real question. Here,
then, it devolves upon us to consider carefully the logical status of
the rival doctrines of so-called Liberty and Necessity. For convenience
of arrangement in what follows, we may best begin with the doctrine of
Necessity, or Determinism.

CHAPTER VI.

THE WILL IN RELATION TO MONISM.

We have now seen that, according to Materialism, the Will is not an
agent, while according both to Spiritualism and to Monism the Will is an
agent. Touching the further question, whether the Will is a free agent,
we have seen that while the question does not exist for Materialism, it
appears to require a negative answer both from Spiritualism and from
Monism. For, as regards its relation to Spiritualism, when once the
ground is cleared of certain errors of statement and fallacies of
reasoning, we appear to find that unless the will is held to be
motiveless--which would be to destroy not only the doctrine of moral
responsibility, but likewise that of universal causation--it must be
regarded as subject to law, or as determined in its action by the nature
of its past history and present circumstances. Lastly, the theory of
Monism appears likewise to deny the possibility of freedom as an
attribute of Will; for, according to this theory, mental processes are
one and the same with physical processes, and hence it does not appear
that the doctrine of determinism could well be taught in a manner more
emphatic.

Thus far, then, the doctrine of determinism is seen to be victorious
over the doctrine of freedom all along the line. By Materialism the
question of freedom is excluded _ab initio_; by Spiritualism and by
Monism, so far as yet seen, it can be logically answered only in the
negative. From which it follows that the sense of moral responsibility
is of the nature of a vast illusion, the historical genesis of which
admits of being easily traced, and the authority of which