he is necessarily
prevented from doing a certain thing seems practically equivalent to
saying that he is necessarily prevented from willing that thing--in all
cases where any question of moral responsibility can possibly obtain,
the distinction is one of fundamental importance. For, as already shown,
any question of moral responsibility can only obtain where two or more
lines of action are alike possible, and therefore where no necessity is
laid upon the man in respect of carrying out his volitions, in whichever
direction they may eventually proceed. Although in any event he is
necessarily bound to adopt means in order to secure his ends, the moral
quality of his choice has reference only to the ends which he chooses;
not at all to the fact that he has to employ means for the purpose of
attaining them. And even though his choice be influenced by his physical
and social environment--as it must be if it be either rational on the
one hand or moral on the other--it does not follow that this influence
is of a kind to neutralize or destroy the causal nature of his own
volition. For the influence which is thus exerted cannot be exerted
necessarily, unless we suppose that the Will is not a first cause, which
is the possibility now under consideration. If the Will is a first
cause, the influences brought to bear upon it by its relation to other
causes--and in virtue of which it is constituted, not only a cause
primal, but also a cause rational and moral--these influences differ
_toto coelo_ from those which are exercised by any members in a series
of secondary causes upon the next succeeding causes. And the difference
consists in the absence of necessary or unconditional sequence in the
one case, and its presence in the other. However strong the determining
influence of a motive may be, if the Will is a first cause, the motive
must belong to a different order of causal relation from a motor; for,
no matter how strong the determining influence may be, _ex hypothesi_ it
can never attain to the strength of necessity; the Will must ever remain
free to overcome such influence by an adequate exercise of its own power
of spontaneous action, or of supplying _de novo_ an additional access of
strength to some other motive. Of course, as a general rule, the Will
allows itself to be influenced by motives supplied immediately by its
relations with the external world; but this is so only because the
thinking substance well knows that it is expe