gnty, and virtually admit its
complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. As the full text
of the ultimatum first reached the Foreign Chancelleries nearly
twenty-four hours after its service upon Servia, the other European
nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the
peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.

[English "White Paper," No. 5; Russian "Orange Paper," No. 3.]

Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance
knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the
fact that on the same day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the
German Empire instructed the German Ambassadors in Paris, London, and
St. Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian Governments
that

"the acts as well as _the demands_ of the Austro-Hungarian
Government cannot but be looked upon as justified."

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the
substance of the ultimatum?

The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does
not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to
the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M. Nevertheless, as the
ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following
day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable
that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully
prepared and formal warning to the other powers on July the 23d unless
it had not only knowledge of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum
but also at least of the substance thereof.

While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of
Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the
communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not
responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the
discreditable character of the whole business--yet the more reasonable
assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at
Belgrade and Germany's warning to the powers were the result of a
concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning
along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this
conclusion for a moment.

The communication for the German Foreign Office last referred to
anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"--why,
if they were justif