d unmistakable reply of your Government
is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this
reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the
subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you,
without delay, order your troops to commit, under no
circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."

This impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist
from military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunely, for
on Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador _for the first time_ declared
to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of
the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in
London. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey,
dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English
Ambassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible
to maintain peace

"if only a little respite in time can be gained before any
great power begins war,"

[English "White Paper," No. 131.]

but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to
demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred
on by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he "let slip the dogs of
war." After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the
Czar telegraphed King George:

"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more I have done all in
my power to avert war."

Such will be the verdict of history.

The Judgment.

These are _the facts_ as shown by the record, and upon them, in my
judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following
judgment:

1--_That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly
concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a
matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing
they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of
Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of
conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable
by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and
disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to
Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and
obligations of all interested nations._

2--_That Germany had at all