y conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my
impression that Germany is rather favorable to the
uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria,"

and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that

"the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the
whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action
on its ally."

[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 43.]

On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had
that night seen the German Chancellor, who had "just returned from
Potsdam," where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor
then showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to
Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would
agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When
asked about the French colonies, no assurance was given.

[English "White Paper," No. 85.]

Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador,
and expressed regret

"that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was
therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's]
suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of
discussion."

[English "White Paper," No. 75.]

On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon
Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. [Russian "Orange
Paper," No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German
Government

"_to suggest any form of procedure_ under which the idea of
mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the
German Government in principle, _could be applied_."

To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for
fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like
pressure it might "_cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and
present a fait accompli_." [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir
Edward Grey, July 29--English "White Paper," No. 70.]

This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while
Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria
might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of
its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's
wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German
Secretary