ors in the sin.

What Gladstone Had in Mind.

What Gladstone had in mind was the scheme of 1866-7, by which France was
to absorb Belgium, with Prussia's consent and aid. He distinctly stated
that the Treaties of 1870 were devised to meet the new state of affairs
disclosed by the publication of this incomplete treaty. It was in order
to prevent the revival of such a conspiracy that Gladstone made separate
and identical treaties in 1870 with France and Prussia. They were a
practical device to secure an effectual enforcement of the Treaty of
1839 under unforeseen and difficult circumstances. The agreement of 1870
was, as Gladstone said, a cumulative treaty added to that of 1839, and
the latter treaty

loses nothing of its force, even during the existence of this
present treaty.

During the course of this speech defending the Government's action
against those critics who claimed that the Treaty of 1839 adequately met
the situation, Gladstone made some general remarks about the extent of
the obligation incurred by the signatories to the Treaty of 1839:

It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into
the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of
that treaty, but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of
those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an
assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee
is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of
the particular position in which it may find itself at the
time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises.

It is, of course, impossible to state precisely what were those
unuttered thoughts that passed through Gladstone's mind as he spoke
these characteristically cautious words, but what in general they were
can be satisfactorily gleaned from a letter that he had written six days
before this to John Bright:

That we should simply declare _we_ will defend the neutrality
of Belgium by arms in case it should be attacked. Now, the
sole or single-handed defense of Belgium would be an
enterprise which we incline to think quixotic; if these two
great military powers [France and Prussia] combined against
it--that combination is the only serious danger; and this it
is which by our proposed engagements we should, I hope, render
improbable to the very last degree. I add for myself this
confession of faith: