ied?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and
Russia that if, as a result of such non-compliance, Austria has
"recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left
to it."

The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question
is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon
Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should
earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,"

and he added that Germany strongly desired

"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of
another power, on account of the various alliance obligations,
would bring consequences impossible to measure."

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole
correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London
affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was
not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why
should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon
England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war
upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker
nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated
Governments of Germany a _confidential communication_ in which he
recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the
part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if
Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added
that

"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this
conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"

but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would
therefore alone--

"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the
Austro-Servian question, _which all the rest of the great
European powers wish to localize_."

In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor
declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of
Servia by Austria. He says "_our closest interests therefore summon us
to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that

"if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the