nist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events
have shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At
best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have
been a deadlock.

Further: "The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office
and asked it 'to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of
conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'"
Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and
Austro-Russian questions "for all practical purposes ... were
indistinguishable." This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of
a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest
stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the
war. The logical explanation of Servia's position is that of Russia's
agent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on
an allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.

It is true that Germany engaged in many blundering diplomatic quibbles
in the final stages of preparation for the war; but it is also true that
England quibbled, though with greater diplomatic finesse; for instance,
"Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that ...
if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace, and
Russia and France rejected it, that 'his Majesty's Government would have
nothing to do with the consequences.'" Here it is apparent to every one
that the word "reasonable" begs the questions.

Slav and Teuton.

The German people were encouraged to relish the idea of a war against
Russia once that war became likely, for sooner or later it seemed
inevitable that Slav and Teuton would clash, and Germany felt confident
that at the present time she outmatched her enemy. The Russians, too,
were encouraged to desire the Slav provinces of Austria, which racially
are a part of the Russian domain. The English people were made to relish
this opportunity to strike their great commercial competitor, especially
when they could do so with little likelihood of unfavorable criticisms.
Finally, the impressionable French people were stirred to thoughts of
revenge and recovery of their lost provinces.

Sympathy with any country in this most disgraceful yet most inevitable
of wars brands the sympathizer as a party to the material and lustful
purposes of at least one of the combatants. There is no ethical
justification of this war from any sta