rvia directed against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
would receive our approval._ We were fully aware in this connection that
warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary against Servia would bring
Russia into the question and might draw us into a war in accordance with
our duties as an ally."

Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact
that the British Ambassador at Berlin, in his letter of July 22 to Sir
Edward Grey, states that _on the preceding night_ (July 21) he had met
the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was
made to a possible action by Austria.

"His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on
Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted that
the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia
and Austria alone, and that there should be no interference
from outside in the discussions between those two countries."

He adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country
should approach Austria-Hungary in the matter, he had

"on several occasions in conversation with the Servian
Minister emphasized the extreme importance that
Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper footing."

[English "White Paper," No. 2.]

Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a
position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to
which Germany tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to
precipitate the war. Forgetful of the solidarity of European
civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse
continuing through many centuries a United European State exists, even
though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that
Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against
Servia without interference from any other power, even though, as was
inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the
Balkan States and even threaten the European balance of power.

No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this
Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in
its demands. It would be difficult to find in history a more offensive
document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which
it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to answer
whether it would compromise its soverei