urg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express
assurance that
"the German Government _had no knowledge of the text of the
Austrian note before it was handed in and has not exercised
any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute to
Germany a threatening attitude_."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 18.]
This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the
two allies and it was Germany's sabre that it was rattling in the face
of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme
measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize
Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a
probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have
committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war
without first consulting Germany.
Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English
Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private
information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the
Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched and telegraphed it
to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador himself "indorses
every line of it." [English "White Paper," No. 95.] As he does not
disclose the source of his "private information," this testimony would
not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official
defense in the German "White Paper," _we find that the German Foreign
Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum
and not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave her a
carte blanche to proceed_.
This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's
attitude and pacific protestations that we quote _in extenso_. After
referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the
German "White Paper" says:
"In view of these circumstances, Austria had to admit that it would not
be consistent either with the dignity or self-preservation of the
monarchy to look on longer at the operations on the other side of the
border without taking action. _The Austro-Hungarian Government advised
us of this view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter. We
were able to assure our ally most heartily of our agreement with her
view of the situation and to assure her that any action that she might
consider it necessary to take in order to put an end to the movement in
Se
|