nd pride in himself. In the
past the Negro had been unable to summon the physical courage and
stamina needed to withstand the shocks of modern battle. Integrating
individual Negroes or small black units into white organizations would
therefore only lower the standard of efficiency of the entire command.
He discounted the integration after the Battle of the Bulge, saying
that it succeeded only because it came at the end of the war and
during pursuit action. "It still remains a moot question," Caffey
concluded, "as to whether the Negroes in integrated units would have
fought in a tough attack or defensive battle." Curiously enough he
went on to say that until Negroes reached the educational level of
whites, they should be organized into small combat units--battalions
and smaller--and attached to white organizations in order to learn the
proper standards of military discipline, conduct, administration, (p. 195)
and training. Despite its unfavorable opinion of experimental black
units, the Army Ground Forces did not reject the whole proposal
outright but asked for a postponement of six months until its own
reorganization, required by the War Department, was completed.[7-80]

[Footnote 7-80: Ltr, Brig Gen B. F. Caffey, CG, 25th
RCT (Prov), Ft. Benning Ga., to CG, AGF, 4 Dec 46,
AGF 291.2; DF, CG, AGF, to D/P&A, 22 Nov 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Military Personnel, WDGPA
291.2 (Negro) (16 Nov 46).]

The other forces also rejected the idea of experimental black units.
General Spaatz once again declared that the mission of the Army Air
Forces was already seriously hampered by budgetary and manpower
limitations and experimentation would only sacrifice time, money,
manpower, and training urgently needed by the Army Air Forces to
fulfill its primary mission. He believed, moreover, that such an
experiment would be weighted in favor of Negroes since comparisons
would be drawn between specially selected and trained black units and
average white units.[7-81] In a similar vein the Director of
Organization and Training, General Hall, found the conversion
"undesirable at this time." He also concluded that the problem was not
limited to training difficulties but involved a "combination of
factors" and could be solved through the application of common sense
by the local commander.[7-82] The Chiefs of Ordnance and the Chemical
Corps, the tec