omplicated the postwar reduction in Army
strength. Since the strength and composition of the Army was fixed by
the defense budget and military planning, the majority of new black
soldiers produced by the quota could be organized into units only at
the expense of white units already in existence. In light of past
performance of black units and in the interests of efficiency and
economy, particularly at a time of reduced operating funds and a
growing cold war, how could the Army justify converting efficient
white units into less capable black units? The same question applied
to the formation of composite units. Grouping lower scoring black
units with white units, many of the Army staff believed, would lower
the efficiency of the whole and complicate the Army's relations with
the civilian community. As a result, the black units remained largely
separate, limited in number, and tremendously overstrength throughout
the postwar period.

Some of these problems, at least, might have been solved had the (p. 205)
Army created a special staff group to oversee the new policy, a key
proposal of the Gillem Board. The Personnel and Administration
Division was primarily interested in individuals, in trying to place
qualified Negroes on an individual basis; the Organization and
Training Division was primarily concerned with units, in trying to
expand the black units to approximate the combat to service ratio of
white units. These interests conflicted at times, and with no single
agency possessing overriding authority, matters came to an impasse,
blocking reform of Army practices. Instead, the staff played a sterile
numbers game, seeking to impose a strict ratio everywhere. But it was
impossible to have a 10 percent proportion of Negroes in every post,
in every area, in every overseas theater; it was equally impossible to
have 10 percent in every activity, in every arm and service, in every
type of task. Yet wherever the Army failed to organize its black
strength by quota, it was open to charges of racial discrimination.

It would be a mistake to overlook the signs of racial progress
achieved under the Gillem Board policy. Because of its provisions
thousands of Negroes came to serve in the postwar Regular Army, many
of them in a host of new assignments and occupations. But if the
policy proved a qualified success in terms of numbers, it still failed
to gain equal treatment and opportunity for black soldiers, and in the
end the racial