ivision; the Personnel and Administration
Division's major emphasis was on finding more jobs for black soldiers
in keeping with the Gillem Board's call for the use of Negroes on a
broader professional scale. This could best be done, Paul decided, by
creating new black units in a variety of specialties and by using more
Negroes in overhead spaces in unit headquarters where black
specialists would be completely interspersed with white. To that end
his office prepared plans in November 1946 listing numerous
occupational specialties that might be offered black recruits. It also
outlined in considerable detail a proposal for converting several
organizations to black units, including a field artillery (155-mm.
howitzer) battalion, a tank company, a chemical mortar company, and an
ordnance heavy automotive maintenance company. These units would be
considered experimental in the sense that the men would be specially
selected and distributed in terms of ability. The officers, Negroes
insofar as practical, and cadre noncommissioned officers would be
specially assigned. Morale and learning ability would be carefully
monitored, and special training would be given men with below average
AGCT scores. At the end of six months, these organizations would be
measured against comparable white units. Mindful of the controversial
aspects of his plan, Paul had a draft circulated among the major
commands and services.[7-79]

[Footnote 7-79: DF, D/P&A to CG, AGF, et al., 16 Nov
46, sub: Proposed Directive, Utilization of Negro
Military Personnel; see also P&A Memo for Rcd, 14
Nov 46; both in WDGPA 291.2 (12 Jul 46).]

The Army Ground Forces, first to answer, concentrated on Paul's
proposal for experimental black units. Maj. Gen. Charles L. Bolte,
speaking for the commanding general, reported that in July 1946 the
command had begun a training experiment to determine the most
effective assignments for black enlisted men in the combat arms.
Because of troop reductions and the policy of discharging individuals
with low test scores, he said, the experiment had lasted only five
weeks. Five weeks was apparently long enough, however, for Brig. Gen.
Benjamin F. Caffey, commander of the 25th Regimental Combat Team
(Provisional), to reach some rather startling conclusions. He
discovered that the black soldier possessed an untrained and
undisciplined mind and lacked confidence a