ical Portrait_ (New York: Free Press, 1960),
pp. 87ff.]

First, segregation was necessary to preserve the internal stability of
the Army. Prejudice was a condition of American society, General of
the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower told a Senate committee in 1948, and the
Army "is merely one of the mirrors that holds up to our faces the
United States of America." Since society separated the races, it
followed that if the Army allowed black and white soldiers to live and
socialize together it ran the very real risk of riots and racial
disturbances which could disrupt its vital functions. Remembering the
contribution of black platoons to the war in Europe, General
Eisenhower, for his part, was willing to accept the risk and integrate
the races by platoons, believing that the social problems "can be
handled," particularly on the large posts. Nevertheless he made no
move toward integrating by platoons while he was Chief of Staff. Later
he explained that

the possibility of applying this lesson [World War II integration
of Negro platoons] to the peacetime Army came up again and again.
Objection involved primarily the social side of the soldier's
life. It was argued that through integration we would get into
all kinds of difficulty in staging soldiers' dances and other
social events. At that time we were primarily occupied in
responding to America's determination "to get the soldiers
home"--so, as I recall, little progress toward integration was
made during that period.[8-66]

[Footnote 8-66: Ltr, DDE to Gen Bruce Clarke
(commander of the 2d Constabulary Brigade when it
was integrated in 1950), 29 May 67, copy in CMH.]

[Illustration: INSPECTION BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF. _General Dwight D.
Eisenhower talks with a soldier of the 25th Combat Team Motor Pool
during a tour of Fort Benning, Georgia, 1947._]

"Liquor and women," Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee pronounced, were the (p. 228)
major ingredients of racial turmoil in the Army. Although General
Lee had been a prime mover in the wartime integration of combat
platoons, he wanted the Army to avoid social integration because of
the disturbances he believed would attend it. As General Omar N.
Bradley saw it, the Army could integrate its training programs but not
the soldier's social life. Hope of progress would be destroyed if
integration was pushed too fast. Bradley