vity to
racial matters that makes life in a biracial society bearable. Until
the recommendations of the board were carried out and discrimination
stopped, they warned the secretary, the Army must expect racial
flare-ups to continue.[8-10]

[Footnote 8-10: Frank L. Stanley, Report of the Negro
Newspaper Publishers Association to the Honorable
Secretary of War on Troops and Conditions in
Europe, 18 Jul 46, copy in CMH.]

Characteristically, the Secretary of War's civilian aide, Marcus Ray,
never denied evidence of misconduct among black troops, but
concentrated instead on finding the cause. Returning from a month's
tour of Pacific installations in September 1946, he bluntly pointed
out to Secretary Patterson that high venereal disease and
court-martial rates among black troops were "in direct proportion to
the high percentage of Class IV and Vs among the Negro personnel."
Given Ray's conclusion, the solution was relatively simple: the Army
should "vigorously implement" its recently promulgated policy, long
supported by Ray, and discharge persons with test scores of less than
seventy.[8-11]

[Footnote 8-11: Ray, Rpt of Tour of Pacific
Installations to SW Patterson, 7 Aug-6 Sep 46, ASW
291.2.]

The civilian aide was not insensitive to the effects of segregation on
black soldiers, but he stressed the practical results of the Army's
policy instead of making a sweeping indictment of segregation. For
example, he criticized the report of the noted criminologist, Leonard
Keeler, who had recently studied the criminal activities of American
troops in Europe for the Army's Criminal Investigation Division. Ray
was critical, not because Keeler had been particularly concerned with
the relatively high black crime rate and its effect on Europeans, but
because the report overlooked the concentration of segregated black
units which had increased the density of Negroes in some areas of
Europe to a point where records and reports of misconduct presented a
false picture. In effect, black crime statistics were meaningless, Ray
believed, as long as the Army's segregation policy remained intact.
Where Keeler implied that the solution was to exclude Negroes from
Europe, Ray believed that the answer lay in desegregating and
spreading them out.[8-12]

[Footnote 8-12: Memo, Ray for ASW Peterse