, for CofS, 25 Jan
46, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in the
Postwar Army, WDGAP 291.2.]

[Illustration: GENERAL PAUL.]

Here, even before the new racial policy was published, the Army staff
ran head on into the realities of postwar manpower needs. In a rapid
demobilization, the Army was critically short of troops, particularly
for overseas replacements, and it could maintain troop strength only
by accepting all the men it could get. Until Paul had more definite
information on the future operations of Selective Service and the rate
of voluntary Regular Army enlistments, he would have to postpone
action to curtail the admission of low-scoring men. So pressing were
the Army's needs that Paul could do nothing to guarantee that black
strength would not greatly exceed the 10 percent figure suggested by
the Gillem Board. He anticipated that by 1 July 1946 the regular and
active reserve components of the Army would together be approximately
15 percent black, a percentage impossible to avoid if the Army was to
retain 1.8 million men. Since all planning had been based on a 10
percent black strength, plans would have to be revised to make use of
the excess. In February 1946 the Chief of Staff approved General
Paul's program: Negroes would continue to be drafted at the 10 percent
ratio; at the same time their enlistment in the Regular Army would
continue without restriction on numbers. Negroes would be limited to
15 percent of the overseas commands, and the continental commands (p. 179)
would absorb all the rest.[7-12]

[Footnote 7-12: DF, ACofS, G-1, 23 Jan 46, sub:
Utilization of Negro Personnel, WDGAP 291.2 (23 Jan
46); Ltr, TAG to CG's, Major Forces, and Overseas
Cmdrs, 4 Feb 46, same sub, AG 291.2 (31 Jan 46)
OB-S-A-M.]

Paul's program for absorbing Negroes faced rough going, for the
already complex manpower situation was further complicated by
limitations on the use of Negroes in certain overseas theaters and the
demands of the War Department's major commands. The Army was
prohibited by an agreement with the State Department from sending
Negroes to the Panama Canal Zone; it also respected an unwritten
agreement that barred black servicemen from Iceland, the Azores, and
China.[7-13] Since the War Department was unable to use Negroes
everywhere, the areas where they could be used had to