ties.[7-9]

[Footnote 7-7: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS, 3 May 46,
sub: Changes to WD Cir 105, 1946, WDGAP 291.2.
Revision appeared as WD Circular 142, 17 May 46.]

[Footnote 7-8: DF, ACofS, G-1, to ASW, 13 May 46,
sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in Postwar Army,
WDGAP 291.2.]

[Footnote 7-9: Ltr, TAG to CG's, AGF, AAF, and ASF, 6
May 46, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower in
Postwar Army, AGAM-PM 291.2 (30 Apr 46); idem to
CG's, 10 Jun 46, same sub, same file (4 Jun 46).]

General Paul believed the principal impediment to practical
application of the new policy was not so much the opposition of field
commanders as the fact that many black units continued to perform
poorly. He agreed with Marcus Ray, Civilian Aide to the Secretary of
War, who had predicted as early as January 1946 that the success of
the Gillem Board's recommendations would depend on how many Negroes of
higher than average ability the armed forces could attract and retain.
Ray reasoned that among the Negroes enlisting in the Regular Army--14
percent of the 1945 total--were large numbers of noncommissioned (p. 178)
officers in the three highest grades whose abilities were limited.
They were able to maintain their ratings, usually in service units,
because their duties required knowledge of neither administration nor
weapons. Truckmasters, foremen, riggers, and the like, they rushed to
reenlist in order to freeze themselves in grade. Since many of these
men were in the two lowest test categories, they could not supply the
leaders needed for black units. Ray wanted to replace these men with
better educated enlistees who could be used on the broadened
professional base recommended by the Gillem Board. To that end he
wanted the Army to test all enlisted men, discharge those below
minimum standards, and launch a recruiting campaign to attract better
qualified men, both black and white.[7-10] For his part, Paul also
deplored the enlistment of men who were, in his words, "mentally
incapable of development into the specialists, technicians, and
instructors that we must have in the post-war Regular Army."[7-11]

[Footnote 7-10: Memo, Marcus H. Ray for ASW, 22 Jan
46, ASW 291.2.]

[Footnote 7-11: Memo, ACofS, G-1