mple, argued that because of the size and nature of
his operation, segregated service was impossible. A substantial number
of his enlisted men also did double duty by serving in air stations
where Negroes could not be segregated, he explained. Only completely
separate aviation units, police and maintenance, and construction
units would be available for Negroes, a state of affairs "which would
be open to adverse criticism." He recommended instead that Negroes in
aviation be used only as stewards.[6-55] He failed to explain how this
solution would escape adverse criticism.

[Footnote 6-55: Memos, Dir, Aviation, for CMC, 26 Apr
46, sub: Negro Personnel in the Post-War Marine
Corps, and 31 May 46, sub: Enlistment of Negroes
"For Duty in Aviation Units Only."]

General Thomas rejected these proposals, repeating that Secretary
Forrestal's nondiscrimination policy demanded that a separate but
equal system be extended throughout the Marine Corps. He also borrowed
one of the Gillem Board's arguments: Negroes must be trained in the
postwar military establishment in every occupation to serve as a cadre
for future general mobilizations.[6-56] Thomas did not mention the fact
that although large branches such as Fleet Marine Force aviation could
maintain separate but equal living facilities for its black marines,
even they would have to provide partially integrated training and
working conditions. And the smaller organizations in the corps would
be forced to integrate fully if forced to accept black marines. In
short, if the corps wanted segregation it must pay the price of
continued discrimination against black marines in terms of numbers
enlisted and occupations assigned.

[Footnote 6-56: Div of Plans and Policies (signed G.
C. Thomas), Consideration of Non-Concurrence, 2 May
46, attached to Memo, Dir, Aviation, for CMC, 26
Apr 46.]

The choice was left to Commandant Vandegrift. One solution to the
"Negro question," General Thomas told him, was complete integration
and the abolition of racial quotas, but Thomas did not press this
solution. Instead, he reviewed for Vandegrift the racial policies of
the other services, pointing out that these policies had more often
been devised to "appease the Negro press and other 'interested' (p. 174)
agencies than to satisfy their own needs