f all
things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters
into the composition of other things.

Obj. 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb.
Dom. [Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an
uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is
part of some compound.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from
each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no
way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same.
But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also
does God. Proof of the minor--whatever things differ, they differ by
some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary
matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each
other.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no
touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling
part with part."

Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with
them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).

_I answer that,_ On this point there have been three errors. Some have
affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De
Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those
who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others
have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was
the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of
Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all
these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to
enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a
material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.
Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of
the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But
primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical
with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the
latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient
cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which
enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and
essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not
act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God
cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a c