must be supported by observation of the actual individual.
What is lacking is any body of observation which has value apart from
some theory. He tests his theory by the observed individual which is
already an embodied theory, rather than by what we are wont to call the
facts. He refers to other observers to disagree with them. He does not
present their observations apart from their theories as material which
has existential value, independent for the time being of any hypothesis.
And it is consistent with this attitude that he never presents the
observations of others in support of his own doctrine. His analysis
within this field of biological observation does not bring him back to
what, in modern science, are the data, but to general characters which
make up the definition of the form. His induction involves a gathering
of individuals rather than of data. Thus analysis in the theoretical,
the natural, the practical, and the productive sciences, leads back to
universals. This is quite consistent with Aristotle's metaphysical
position that since the matter of natural objects has reality through
its realization in the form, whatever appears without such meaning can
be accounted for only as the expression of the resistance which matter
offers to this realization. This is the field of a blind necessity, not
that of a constructive science.
Continuous advance in science has been possible only when analysis of
the object of knowledge has supplied not elements of meanings as the
objects have been conceived but elements abstracted from those meanings.
That is, scientific advance implies a willingness to remain on terms of
tolerant acceptance of the reality of what cannot be stated in the
accepted doctrine of the time, but what must be stated in the form of
contradiction with these accepted doctrines. The domain of what is
usually connoted by the term facts or data belongs to the field lying
between the old doctrine and the new. This field is not inhabited by the
Aristotelian individual, for the individual is but the realization of
the form or universal essence. When the new theory has displaced the
old, the new individual appears in the place of its predecessor, but
during the period within which the old theory is being dislodged and the
new is arising, a consciously growing science finds itself occupied with
what is on the one hand the debris of the old and on the other the
building material of the new. Obviously, this must fi
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