nceptions which belong to the understanding,
we naturally expect that each distinction will be found directly to
involve a special conception or category, and that therefore, to
discover the categories, we need only look for the special conception
involved in each form of judgement.[21] Again, since the plurality
unified in a judgement of each form is the two conceptions or
judgements which form the matter of the judgement, we should expect
the conception involved in each form of judgement to be merely the
type of relationship established between these conceptions or
judgements. This expectation is confirmed by a cursory glance at the
table of categories.[22]

I. _Of Quantity._
Unity
Plurality
Totality.

II. _Of Quality._
Reality
Negation
Limitation.

III. _Of Relation._
Inherence and Subsistence (_Substantia et Accidens_)
Causality and Dependence (_Cause and Effect_)
Community (_Reciprocity between the agent and patient._)

IV. _Of Modality._
Possibility--Impossibility
Existence--Non-existence
Necessity--Contingence.

If we compare the first division of these categories with the first
division of judgements we naturally think that Kant conceived
singular, particular, and universal judgements to unify their terms
by means of the conceptions of 'one', of 'some', and of 'all'
respectively; and we form corresponding, though less confident,
expectations in the case of the other divisions.

[21] This expectation is confirmed by Kant's view that
judgement introduces unity into a plurality by means of a
conception. This view leads us to expect that different forms
of judgement--if there be any--will be distinguished by the
different conceptions through which they unify the plurality;
for it will naturally be the different conceptions involved
which are responsible for the different kinds of unity
effected.

[22] B. 106, M. 64.

Kant, however, makes no attempt to show that each form of judgement
distinguished by Formal Logic involves a special conception. In fact,
his view is that the activities of thought studied by Formal Logic do
not originate or use any special conceptions at all. For his actual
deduction of the categories[23] is occupied in showing that although
thought, when exercised under the conditions under which it is studied
by Formal Logic, does not originate and use