Ushant
to seize a favourable opportunity for action, which resulted in his
capturing a convoy of military stores essential to the French operations in
the West Indies under the nose of De Guichen with an escort of nearly twice
his force.

Nelson certainly shared Kempenfelt's views as to the possibilities of an
inferior fleet kept actively in being. "As to our fleet," he wrote from the
Mediterranean in 1796, "under such a commander-in-chief as Sir John Jervis
nobody has any fear ... We are now twenty-two sail of the line. The
combined fleet will not be above thirty-five.... I will venture my life Sir
John Jervis defeats them. I do not mean by a regular battle, but by the
skill of our admiral and the activity and spirit of our officers and
seamen. This country is the most favourable possible for that skill with an
inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable, that some one time in
twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and
the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind. Therefore I hope the
Government will not be alarmed for our safety."

Such a conception of the defensive may indeed be said to have become
current in the British service. It was part of the reasoning which in 1805,
after Villeneuve's escape from the Mediterranean, decided Sir John Orde to
fall back on Ushant instead of entering the Straits. "I dare believe," he
wrote, "Lord Nelson will be found in condition with his twelve of the line
and numerous frigates to act on the defensive without loss and even to hang
on to the skirts of the enemy's fleet should it attempt any material
service, especially when encumbered with troops."

In all this consideration of the potentialities of "a fleet in being"
operating defensively it must never be forgotten that we are dealing with
its possibilities in relation to a general command of the sea--to its
general power of holding such command in dispute, as Torrington used it.
Its power of preventing a particular operation, such as oversea invasion,
is another matter, which will always depend upon the local conditions. If
the "fleet in being" can be contained in such a way that it is impossible
for it to reach the invading line of passage, it will be no bar to
invasion. In 1690, so far as Torrington's fleet was concerned, the French,
had they been so minded, might have made a descent, say, at Portsmouth
while Torrington was at the Nore. But Torrington's fleet was not the only
factor. Hi