e enemy's at home, it would be more
advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to
gain the superiority elsewhere."

"When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to
watch and attend upon their motions, such a squadron should be composed of
two-decked ships only [that is, ships of the highest mobility] as to assure
it purpose. It must have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under
certain circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to give
up some of its heavy sailers. It is highly necessary to have such a flying
squadron to hang on the enemy's large fleet, as it will prevent their
dividing into separate squadrons for intercepting your trade or spreading
their ships for a more extensive view. You will be at hand to profit from
any accidental separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales,
fogs, or other causes. You may intercept supplies, intelligence, &c, sent
to them. In fine, such a squadron will be a check and restraint upon their
motions, and prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise do."

Three years before, when first called to be Chief of the Staff in the
Channel, he had emphasised the same points. "Much," he wrote in July 1779,
"I may say all, depends upon this fleet. 'Tis an inferior against a
superior fleet. Therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to
counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable
opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at
some or other feeble part of the enemy's line; or if such opportunities
don't offer, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his
attempting anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, and
oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard against your
attack."[21]

[21] _Barham Papers_, i, 292.

It was on these lines the war was conducted. The West Indian area, in which
lay the enemy's principal object, was treated as the offensive theatre and
the home waters as the defensive. Inferior as was the Channel fleet to the
home fleet of the allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to
prevent their achieving any success. Nor was this all, for Kempenfelt was
able to demonstrate the positive side of his theory in the most brilliant
and convincing manner. In dealing with concentration we have seen how, in
command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, he was able off