the relation is not far to
seek, though it has become obscured by two maxims. The one is, that "the
command of the sea depends upon battleships," and the other, that "cruisers
are the eyes of the fleet." It is the inherent evil of maxims that they
tend to get stretched beyond their original meaning. Both of these express
a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. On no theory of naval
warfare can we expect to command the sea with battleships, nor, on the
communication theory, can we regard the primary function of cruisers as
being to scout for a battle-fleet. It is perfectly true that the control
depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile
battle-fleet, as it usually is. It is also true that, so far as is
necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the control, we have to
furnish it with eyes from our cruiser force. But it does not follow that
this is the primary function of cruisers. The truth is, we have to withdraw
them from their primary function in order to do work for the battle-fleet
which it cannot do for itself.
Well established as is the "Eyes of the fleet" maxim, it would be very
difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded as the primary function
of cruisers by the highest authorities. In Nelson's practice at least their
paramount function was to exercise the control which he was securing with
his battle-squadron. Nothing is more familiar in naval history than his
incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but the
significance of that cry has become obscured. It was not that his cruisers
were not numerous in proportion to his battleships--they were usually
nearly double in number--but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced
of their true function, that he used them to exercise control to an extent
which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below the limit of bare
necessity. The result on a memorable occasion was the escape of the enemy's
battle-fleet, but the further result is equally important. It was that the
escape of that fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was
charged to maintain. His judgment may have been at fault, but the
strategical distribution of his force was consistent throughout the whole
period of his Mediterranean command. Judged by his record, no man ever
grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to
control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number
of cruisers to
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