tionary alphabet table. The
diacritical marks have been lost.

The Polity of the Lacedaemonians talks about the
laws and institutions created by Lycurgus, which
train and develop Spartan citizens from birth to
old age.

THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS

I

Now, as concerning the Polity of the Athenians, (1) and the type or
manner of constitution which they have chosen, (2) I praise it not,
in so far as the very choice involves the welfare of the baser folk as
opposed to that of the better class. I repeat, I withhold my praise so
far; but, given the fact that this is the type agreed upon, I propose
to show that they set about its preservation in the right way; and that
those other transactions in connection with it, which are looked upon as
blunders by the rest of the Hellenic world, are the reverse.

(1) See Grote, "H. G." vi. p. 47 foll.; Thuc. i. 76, 77; viii. 48;
Boeckh, "P. E. A." passim; Hartman, "An. Xen. N." cap. viii.;
Roquette, "Xen. Vit." S. 26; Newman, "Pol. Arist." i. 538; and
"Xenophontis qui fertur libellus de Republica Atheniensium," ed.
A. Kirchhoff (MDCCCLXXIV), whose text I have chiefly followed.

(2) Lit. "I do not praise their choice of the (particular) type, in so
far as..."

In the first place, I maintain, it is only just that the poorer classes
(3) and the People of Athens should be better off than the men of birth
and wealth, seeing that it is the people who man the fleet, (4) and put
round the city her girdle of power. The steersman, (5) the boatswain,
the lieutenant, (6) the look-out-man at the prow, the shipright--these
are the people who engird the city with power far rather than her heavy
infantry (7) and men of birth of quality. This being the case, it seems
only just that offices of state should be thrown open to every one both
in the ballot (8) and the show of hands, and that the right of speech
should belong to any one who likes, without restriction. For, observe,
(9) there are many of these offices which, according as they are in good
or in bad hands, are a source of safety or of danger to the People, and
in these the People prudently abstains from sharing; as, for instance,
it does not think it incumbent on itself to share in the functions of
the general or of the commander of cavalry. (10) The sovereign People
recognises the fact that in forgoing the personal exercise of these
offices, and leaving them to the control of the