at Committee, under a Republican
organization, would presumably be hostile to the plan for a League
advocated by the President. The Committee could hinder and possibly
prevent the acceptance of the Covenant, while it would have the
opportunity to place the opposition's case in a favorable light before
the American people and to attack the President's conduct of the
negotiations at Paris.
I believe that the President realized the loss of strategic position
which he had sustained by the Democratic defeat at the polls in
November, 1918, but was persuaded that, by making certain alterations in
the Covenant suggested by Republicans favorable to the formation of a
League, and especially those advocating a League to Enforce Peace, he
would be able to win sufficient support in the Senate and from the
people to deprive his antagonists of the advantage which they had gained
by the elections. This he sought to do on his return to Paris about the
middle of March. If the same spirit of compromise had been shown while
he was in America it would doubtless have gone far to weaken hostility
to the Covenant. Unfortunately for his purpose he assumed a contrary
attitude, and in consequence the sentiment against the League was
crystallized and less responsive to the concessions which the President
appeared willing to make when the Commission on the League of Nations
resumed its sittings, especially as the obnoxious Article 10
remained intact.
In the formulation of the amendments to the Covenant, which were
incorporated in it after the President's return from the United States
and before its final adoption by the Conference, I had no part and I
have no reason to think that Mr. White or General Bliss shared in the
work. As these amendments or modifications did not affect the theory of
organization or the fundamental principles of the League, they in no way
changed my views or lessened the differences between the President's
judgment and mine. Our differences were as to the bases and not as to
the details of the Covenant. Since there was no disposition to change
the former we were no nearer an agreement than we were in January.
The President's visit to the United States had been disappointing to the
friends of a League in that he had failed to rally to the support of the
Covenant an overwhelming popular sentiment in its favor which the
opposition in the Senate could not resist. The natural reaction was that
the peoples of Europe and thei
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