to persuade the President to accept
as a substitute for it a self-denying or negative covenant which
amounted to a promise of "hands-off" and in no way required the
formation of an international oligarchy to make it effective.

In addition to the foregoing objection I opposed the guaranty on the
ground that it was politically inexpedient to attempt to bind the United
States by a treaty provision which by its terms would certainly invite
attack as to its constitutionality. Without entering into the strength
of the legal argument, and without denying that there are two sides to
the question, the fact that it was open to debate whether the
treaty-making power under the Constitution could or could not obligate
the Government of the United States to make war under certain conditions
was in my judgment a practical reason for avoiding the issue. If the
power existed to so bind the United States by treaty on the theory that
the Federal Government could not be restricted in its right to make
international agreements, then the guaranty would be attacked as an
unwise and needless departure from the traditional policies of the
Republic. If the power did not exist, then the violation of the
Constitution would be an effective argument against such an undertaking.
Whatever the conclusion might be, therefore, as to the legality of the
guaranty or as to whether the obligation was legal or moral in nature,
it did not seem possible for it to escape criticism and vigorous attack
in America.

It seemed to me that the President's guaranty was so vulnerable from
every angle that to insist upon it would endanger the acceptance of any
treaty negotiated if the Covenant was, in accordance with the
President's plan, made an integral part of it. Then, too, opposition
would, in my opinion, develop on the ground that the guaranty would
permit European Powers to participate, if they could not act
independently, in the forcible settlement of international quarrels in
the Western Hemisphere whenever there was an actual invasion of
territory or violation of sovereignty, while conversely the United
States would be morally, if not legally, bound to take part in coercive
measures in composing European differences under similar conditions. It
could be urged with much force that the Monroe Doctrine in the one case
and the Washington policy of avoiding "entangling alliances" in the
other would be so affected that they would both have to be substantially
aban