Orations, p.
140.

[9] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, pp. 202-3.

[10] See interview with M. Denys Cochin at Messina, in the _Daily
Mail_, 29 Nov., 1915. Cp. _Le Temps_, 25 Nov.

[11] Skouloudis, _Apantesis_, pp. 4-5; _Semeioseis_, p. 46.

[12] _Journal Officiel_, pp. 71-2.

[13] _Life of Kitchener_, Vol. III, p. 199-203.

[14] Communication by the Entente Ministers, Athens, 10/23 Nov., 1915.

[15] Skouloudis to Entente Ministers, Athens, 11/24 Nov., 1915.

[16] "_Le Gouvernement Grec se reservait de protester; nous nous
reservions de ne pas repondre_. (_Rires_)." M. Briand in the _Journal
Officiel_, p. 72.

[17] _White Book_, No. 54.

{85}

CHAPTER VIII

The situation did not clear--how could it? Of all diplomatic fictions
that of "benevolence" is perhaps the most incompatible with the grim
realities of war.

General Sarrail had from the outset been empowered to take any measures
which he might judge necessary at his discretion. But fear of the
Greek army for a time compelled him to temper vigour with caution.
That fear decreased in proportion as the Allied contingents in
Macedonia increased; and hence a series of acts which show how the
General used his discretion.

First, he judged it necessary to blow up the bridge of Demir-Hissar.
He blew it up--thus completely cutting off the Greek forces in Eastern
Macedonia, and, incidentally, letting the enemy know that no offensive
across the Struma was contemplated by the Allies. Next, he judged it
necessary to seize the Fort of Kara-Burnu which commands the entrance
to Salonica Harbour. He seized it--despite a solemn engagement to the
contrary.[1] Then he judged it necessary to occupy the town of
Florina. He occupied it. An appreciation of the efficacy or
expediency of these measures--beyond a passing allusion to the obvious
blunder committed by the destruction of the Demir-Hissar bridge--would
be out of place here. For our present purpose their interest lies in
the light they throw upon the conditions, apart from the purely
military difficulties, created by the intrusion of foreign troops on
neutral soil.

Afloat the Allies were not less vigorous than ashore. They judged it
necessary to occupy Corfu, in order to accommodate the remnants of the
Servian army that had escaped across Albania. They occupied Corfu.
They judged it necessary to occupy Castellorizo, an islet off the coast
of Asia Minor. They occupied Castellorizo. They {86}