only meant to
denote one Being, identified with God, and God is not the only Noumenon."
The description of a Noumenon! This is almost equal to the discovery of a
Noumenon Space. Does Mr. Mill really suppose that all noumena are
self-existent? A _noumenon_ (in the sense in which we suppose Mr. Mill to
understand the term, for it has different meanings in different
philosophies) implies an existence out of relation to the human
mind.[BE] But is this the same as being out of all relation whatever,
as existing "in and by itself?" Does Mr. Mill mean to say that a
creature, whether perceived by us or not, has no relation to its Creator?
But Mr. Mill, as we have seen before, is not much at home when he gets
among "noumena." We must proceed to his criticism of the second part of
the definition,--"having no necessary relation to any other being." Of
these words he says, that "they admit of two constructions. The words in
their natural sense only mean, _capable of existing out of relation to
anything else_. The argument requires that they should mean _incapable of
existing in relation with anything else_." And why is this non-natural
sense to be forced upon very plain words? Because, says Mr. Mill,--
[BE] Strictly speaking, the term _noumenon_, as meaning that
which can be apprehended only by the intellect, implies
a relation to the intellect apprehending it; and in this
sense [Greek: to nooumenon] is opposed by Plato to
[Greek: to horomenon]--the object of intellect to the
object of sight. But as the intellect was supposed to
take cognisance of things as they are, in opposition to
the sensitive perception of things as they appear, the
term _noumenon_ became synonymous with _thing in itself_
([Greek: to hon kath' hauto]). And this meaning is
retained in the Kantian philosophy, in which the
_noumenon_ is identical with the _Ding an sich_. But as
Kant denied to the human intellect any immediate
intuition of things as they are (though such an
intuition may be possible to a superhuman intellect),
hence the term _noumenon_ in the Kantian philosophy is
opposed to all of which the human intellect can take
positive cognisance. Hamilton, in this respect, agrees
with Kant. But neither Kant nor Hamilton, in opposing
the _thing in itself_ to the _phenomenon_, meant to
imply that the former is necess
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