critic, in this very chapter, been arguing against Mr. Mansel on the
question, whether the Absolute can be conceived as a Cause acting in
time: and what is this but a form of the question, whether power, when
predicated of God is exactly the same thing as power when predicated of
man? Or why has it been said that creation _ex nihilo_--an absolutely
first act of causation, is inconceivable by us, but from the
impossibility of finding in human power an exact type of Divine power? To
attribute discreditable motives to an opponent, even to account for
unquestionable facts, is usually considered as an abuse of criticism.
What shall we say when the facts are fictitious as well as the motives?
With regard to Mr. Mansel, the only person who is included by name in
this accusation, it is "worthy of remark," that the earliest mention of
the obnoxious theory in his writings occurs in connection with a
difficulty relating solely to the conception of infinite power, and not
at all to the moral attributes of God.[BG]

[BG] See _Prolegomena Logica_, p. 77 (2nd ed., p. 85.)

Mr. Mill concludes this chapter with another instance of that _ignoratio
elenchi_ which has been so abundantly manifested throughout his previous
criticisms. His opponent, he allows, "would and does admit that the
qualities as conceived by us bear _some likeness_ to the justice and
goodness which belong to God, since man was made in God's image." But he
considers that this "semi-concession" "destroys the whole fabric" of Mr.
Mansel's argument. "The Divine goodness," he says, "which is said to be a
different thing from human goodness, but of which the human conception of
goodness is some imperfect reflexion or resemblance, does it agree with
what men call goodness in the _essence_ of the quality--in what
_constitutes_ it goodness? If it does, the 'Rationalists' are right; it
is not illicit to reason from the one to the other. If not, the divine
attribute, whatever else it may be, is not goodness, and ought not to be
called by the name." Now the question really at issue is not whether the
"Rationalist" argument is licit or illicit, but whether, in its lawful
use, it is to be regarded as infallible or fallible. We have already
quoted a portion of Mr. Mansel's language on this point; we will now
quote two more passages, which, without any comment, will sufficiently
show how utterly Mr. Mill has mistaken the purport of the argument which
he has undertaken to examine.