erstand by them
that which is absolute or infinite in some given attribute; as
space is called infinite, meaning that it is infinite in extension;
and as God is termed infinite, in the sense of possessing infinite
power, and absolute in the sense of absolute goodness or knowledge.
It has also been shown that Sir W. Hamilton's arguments for the
unknowableness of the Unconditioned do not prove that we cannot
know an object which is absolute or infinite in some specific
attribute, but only that we cannot know an abstraction called 'The
Absolute' or 'The Infinite,' which is supposed to have all
attributes at once."--(P. 93.)

The fallacy of this criticism, as regards Sir W. Hamilton, has been
already pointed out: as regards Mr. Mansel, it is still more glaring,
inasmuch as that writer expressly states that he uses the term _absolute_
in a different sense from that which Mr. Mill attributes to Sir W.
Hamilton. When Mr. Mill charges Mr. Mansel with "undertaking to prove the
impossibility" of conceiving "a Being _absolutely_ just or _absolutely_
wise"[BF] (_i.e._, as he supposes, _perfectly_ just or wise), he
actually forgets that he has just been criticising Mr. Hansel's
definition of the Absolute, as something having a possible existence "out
of all relation." Will Mr. Mill have the kindness to tell us what he
means by goodness and knowledge "out of all relation;" _i.e._, a goodness
and knowledge related to no object on which they can be exercised; a
goodness which is good to nothing, a knowledge which knows nothing? Mr.
Mill had better be cautious in talking about _ignoratio elenchi_.

[BF] _Examination_, p. 95.

From the Absolute, Mr. Mill proceeds to the Infinite; and here he commits
the same mistake as before, treating a portion of an argument as if it
were the whole, and citing a portion intended to prove one point as if it
were intended to prove another. He cites a passage from Mr. Mansel, in
which it is said that "the Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all,
must be conceived as potentially everything and actually nothing; for if
there is anything in general which it cannot become, it is thereby
limited; and if there is anything in particular which it actually is, it
is thereby excluded from being any other thing. But, again, it must also
be conceived as actually everything and potentially nothing; for an
unrealised potentiality is likewise a limitation. If the Infinite can be
that which it